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LICENSING AND MERCHANDISING OF
CHARACTERS: ART LAW TOPIC FOR
AALS 1994
PHILLIP EDWARD PAGE*
The selection of Orlando as the site for the 1994 meeting of
the American Association of Law Schools prompted the Art Law
Section Chairman, Tom Goetzl, and others to consider the cartoon
character as both a work of art, thus the topic's embrace by the
Art Law Section, and as a problem for energetic entrepreneurs and
intellectual property theorists. The Intellectual Property Law Sec-
tion had already announced its topic as being the appropriation of
imagery, which presumably includes the images of popular charac-
ters. We therefore chose not to pursue the issue of fair use of these
revered and familiar characters, or other issues that were likely to
dominate discussion in the Intellectual Property meeting. Our pri-
mary purpose was to explore how visually depicted characters have
come to be protected, and how they will be protected in the future.
Our panelists discussed the various bases for character protection,
recent trends reflecting untested assumptions about the desirabil-
ity of vigorous protection, and the need for clear analysis as copy-
right and trademark notions increasingly supplement or succeed
one another.
Both the market use of characters and the rights associated
with their creation and use have changed significantly in recent de-
cades.' While .capitalizing on the public fancy for popular charac-
* B.S., University of Tennesse, 1971; J.D., Memphis State University, 1980; L.L.M.
New York University, 1983; Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas.
1. "In 1980, sales of licensed products worldwide amounted to $10 billion, according to
the LICENSING LETrER, a newsletter. [In 1989], sales hit a record $64.6 billion. While the
biggest licensing category is trademarks and brand names, cartoon characters like the Simp-
sons represent a healthy $12 billion chunk of the industry." N.R. Kleinfield, Cashing in on a
Hot New Brand Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1990, § 3, at 1; "Walt Disney Company's retail
stores sell an average of more than $600 of merchandise per square foot of selling space each
1
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ters is not altogether a recent phenomenon,2 nothing approaches
the degree of use associated with modern merchandising. Espe-
cially when visually depicted, these creatures of our popular cul-
ture seem to be everywhere, and not just in Orlando. They adorn
our clothing and lunch boxes; they grace the bandages that bind
our children's wounds (any parent knows the predicament of try-
ing to staunch the flow of blood with Batman while the thrashing,
injured party insists, instead, upon the application of Sonic
Hedgehog). These characters wrap our food; sometimes they are
our food. The author was able to report to the Orlando conferees
that on the previous day my six-year-old daughter, no stranger to
frozen confections, enjoyed an ice cream in the shape of a notable
mouse's face, and seemed to find it altogether more delicious for
having been Mickey-molded.
The increased ability to manufacture and market products
bearing a character's image makes a character a more valuable
commodity. Additionally, as advancing technology has creates new
media opportunities, the exploitation of characters in various en-
tertainments has proliferated.' But, as this century's new media
and marketing techniques made character use more attractive, by
the creator and unauthorized others, the protection available to
the author or entrepreneur became questionable. Although charac-
ters were created and licensed as though they were the vessels of
exclusive rights,4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the "Sam
Spade" case5 suggested that only the most dominant of character
creations would be separately protected by copyright. While
year, better than twice the industry average for a specialty retailer. The average store gener-
ates net annual sales of about $2 million." Richard W. Stevenson, Disney Stores: Magic in
Retail?, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1990, at Dl, D18.
2. Shakespeare is alleged to have written THE MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR because
Queen Elizabeth had been "so well pleased with that admirable character of Falstaff in the
two parts of HENRY IV that she commanded him to continue it for one play more and show
him in love." Leslie Hotson, THE FIRST NIGHT OF TWELFTH NIGHT 180 (1954), as quoted in
Anne Somerset, ELIZABETH I 370 (1991). In response to public demand, Arthur Conan Doyle
trotted out Sherlock Holmes more often than he wished, HESKETH PEARSON, CONAN DOYLE
96 (1943). Mark Twain reused a character from THE ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER (1876) for
his masterpiece, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1884). Indeed, he later reused
both characters in "a frank attempt to cash in on the current rage for Sherlock Holmes...
" JUSTIN KAPLAN, MR. CLEMENS AND MARK TWAIN 332 (1966).
3. See Jura Koncins, Toys-Toys-Toys-Toys-Toys, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 24, 1994,
(Washington Home) at p. 10; Ellen Edwards, PBS Missing Out on 'Barney' Bucks; Tie-Ins
Reap Millions for Creators, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 13, 1993, § A, at 1.
4. Richard Wincor, Book Review of KAPLAN, An Unhurried View of Copyright, 76
YALE L.J. 1473, 1479 (1967).
5. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
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Learned Hand had previously indicated that not all characters
were created copyright equal,6 the Ninth Circuit stated that only
those characters so central to the work that they were "the story
being told," could be meaningfully licensed apart from the work in
which they appeared.
7
This skepticism about character protection, although regarded
as more than provocative dicta,8 was never widely embraced.9 Even
in the Ninth Circuit, an important distinction came to be made
between literary characters, such as Sam Spade in the Dashiel
Hammett mysteries, and characters, like Mickey Mouse or Super-
man, that were created for visual or audio-visual media.10 With
this distinction made, and the Sam Spade limitation itself in some
doubt, the way was clear for courts to enforce strong exclusive
rights for character creations.
This they did. As characters became ubiquitous in our popular
culture and merchandising, their protection became increasingly
robust.1 While copyright was generally the theory under which the
owner prevented use of the character, trademark, unfair competi-
tion, and related doctrines have also been relied upon." Indeed, it
has not always been clear what theory of protection the courts
were employing.1 s While there may once have been Sam Spade-
6. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
7. Warner Bros., 216 F.2d at 950.
8. See NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.12, n.13 (1963); Victor S. Netterville, Copyright
and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 So. CAL. L.R. 225,
243-45 (1962); Melville B. Nimmer, COPYRIGHT 1955, 43 CAL. L.R. 791 (1955).
9. "IW]e think it sensible to say that the constitutional clause extends to any con-
crete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation .... " Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 1967). "[Sluch a conclusion would be clearly
untenable from the standpoint of public policy, for it would effectively permit the unre-
strained pilfering of characters." Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406
n.1 (2nd Cir. 1970).
10. Walt Disney Prod. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
11. Michael Todd Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The
Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial
Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
12. See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (holding that the
applicant's drawings of fictitious comic book characters were not descriptive of toy dolls to
such an extent that they were incapable of functioning as trademarks for such dolls);
Gruelle v. Molly-E's Doll Outfitters, 94 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 561
(1938) (holding that the designer of "Raggedy Ann" and "Raggedy Andy" dolls could pre-
vent the use of the names, but could not enjoin the sale of similar dolls, where the law of
copyright was not invoked).
13. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.
N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying "total concept and feel" to both
trademark and copyright analysis); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 746
F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying "total look and feel" test in its trademark analysis).
1994]
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inspired doubt about the protectability of characters, courts are in-
creasingly resorting to any theory-sometimes a curious combina-
tion of theories"-that would protect the proprietor against unau-
thorized use. These remedies are, of course, useful in securing the
proprietor a more assured return on his investment. 6 Whether the
proprietor should have so ample an arsenal was a question central
to the panel discussion.
The most obvious question raised in resorting to trademark
notions as a method of character protection is the problem of
perpetuity. Copyrights are necessarily of limited duration.16 The
protections of trademark and unfair competition do not have fixed
terms, but persist so long as the defendant's activity is likely to
cause confusion. 17 The longer the character is associated with the
copyright proprietor, now approximately seventy-five years,1 8 the
stronger the public association of character and proprietor is likely
to be. The stronger the association with the original proprietor, the
more likely is the resulting confusion if others begin to exploit the
character, even after the copyright expires.' 9 Some have been con-
14. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985). "We think ...that plaintiffs remedy more properly lies under the Copyright
Act. Nevertheless, . . . where the product sold by plaintiff is 'entertainment' in one form or
another, then not only the advertising of the product but also an ingredient of the product
itself can amount to a trademark ...." DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assoc., 486 F. Supp.
1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 159, 162 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that a hybrid form of protection including the
term of protection of copyright and the absolute monopoly of trademark: "Famous character
names in copyrighted works may not be used by others during the life of the copyright
without the authorization of the copyright proprietor").
15. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 1282 (1991), lower courts frequently felt obliged to re-
ward an industrious plaintiff where there was a free-riding defendant. See, e.g., Hutchison
Telephone Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., Inc., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985); Illinois
Bell Telephone Co. v. Haines Co., Inc., 905 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990).
16. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (the authority to "secur[e] for limited Times to Au-
thors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings ...."); Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 230 (1990) ("the 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term ....1").
17. Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 929 (C.C.P.A. 1964); Time
Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D.N.J. 1976).
18. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 135 (1976) ("If life expectancy in
1909, which was in the neighborhood of 56 years, offered a rough guide to the length of
copyright protection, then life expectancy in the 1970s which is well over 70 years, should
offer a similar guide; the Register's 1961 Report included statistics indicating that some-
thing between 70 and 76 years was then the average equivalent of life-plus-50 years.").
19. Courts have been sensitive to this problem where it is the 17-year patent monopoly
that creates an identification between manufacturer and product shape in the public mind.
See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). Indeed, where the config-
uration, or "trade dress," is the result of patented technology, the courts are likely to deny a
trademark interest in the product shape as being "functional," thus unprotectable. See In re
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cerned about the possibility of using the copyright to leverage an
invulnerable trademark position for an undetermined period. If the
trademark, though certainly different from copyright, continues ef-
fectively to preserve the monopoly over the character, then the
"limited times" policy of copyright may indeed be undercut.2 0 The
panelists were asked to consider whether trademark notions might
ultimately serve as a kind of legal cryogenics, keeping Disney char-
acters forever in a state of protected and suspended, well,
animation.
Although the cartoon character was the particular focus of the
panel, other forms of art might profit from the same scrutiny. Af-
ter all, if a particular mouse may be emblematic of the Disney em-
pire, then the melting watch may similarly signify the Salvador
Dali estate. If courts protect artistic style, whatever that is,2 under
unfair competition, 22 then copyright may begin to yield to trade-
mark as works of popular art, whether by Disney or Dali, Warner
Brothers or Warhol, come within a scythe's distance of the grim
copyright reaper.
It is difficult to imagine being blessed with a livelier or better
equipped panel to explore these issues. Our first speaker was Peter
F. Nolan, vice-president and assistant general counsel of the Walt
Disney Company. Mr. Nolan has been with Disney for over twenty
years, prior to which he served in the U.S. Copyright Office and as
an associate at the Washington, D.C. firm of Pattishall, McAuliffe
& Hofstetter. Mr. Nolan provided the background for the discus-
sion and outlined the various theories under which characters
Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The doctrine of functional-
ity serves to deny the aspiring trademark proprietor the benefit of his patent monopoly in
creating, or at least enjoying, the secondary meaning that attaches to his product. Id. at
1342. There may yet develop a comparable doctrine that would deny full trademark protec-
tion for characters or other works that have already enjoyed a full copyright life.
20. Some have suggested, on the other hand, that there is really no need to be con-
cerned about the relationship between copyright and trademark protection since they are
such very different vehicles in terms of acquisition, scope of protection, formalities, and
other characteristics. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 6.04[2] (3d ed. 1992). Just as the availability of design patent has been largely
untied from possible or actual copyright protection, see, In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1395
(C.C.P.A. 1974) ("Neither the copyright statute nor the patent statute says that because a
thing is copyrighted it may not be patented as a design."), but see, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a)
(1991) (holding that design patents having been issued precludes copyright registration for
the same article), so might the trademark analysis be entirely independent of the copyright-
able nature of the matter serving as an indicator of origin for trademark purposes.
21. See Michelle Brownlee, Safeguarding Style: What Protection is Afforded to Vis-
ual Artists by the Copyright and Trademark Laws?, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1157, 1158 (1993).
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might be protected. In addition to the theories the panel was pre-
pared to examine, he suggested that there might be something
comparable to the right of publicity that characters, even though
they are not natural persons, might enjoy.
Our second speaker was Professor Jessica Litman of Wayne
State University. Professor Litman has written widely on copyright
issues and is the co-author, with Jane Ginsburg, of the recent sup-
plement to Ginsburg, Goldberg & Greenbaum, Trademark and
Unfair Competition Law. In her recent scholarly work, Professor
Litman has emphasized the importance of the public domain, and
challenged the assumption that more protection necessarily makes
for a more desirable intellectual property regime.
Our third speaker was Professor Leslie Kurtz of the University
of California at Davis, who has written more specifically than the
other panelists about the protection of characters. In her writings,
Professor Kurtz has been sensitive to the problems created when
principles of copyright and trademark too freely converge.
Our fourth speaker was Professor Marshall Leaffer. Among his
more notable achievements, in addition to his valuable Under-
standing Copyright Law, is his recent analysis of international is-
sues in copyright. Professor Leaffer provided the discussion with
an international and comparative perspective, and in doing so, an-
alyzed how concerns about convergence, perpetuity, and other
matters have been handled by other regimes, particularly in the
United Kingdom.
Finally, we were especially pleased to have Judge Alex Kozin-
ski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, not only for his perspec-
tive from the bench, but also for his ability to enliven any discus-
sion. Judge Kozinski has written several notable opinions dealing
with intellectual property issues. He has contributed handsomely
to the scholarship in the area, most recently with his article,
Trademarks Unplugged, in the New York University Law
Review.
2 3
All of the speakers were sensitive to the tension that inevita-
bly exists between proper incentives and appropriate liberty to
make use of the common culture. As unfair competition principles
are applied more often in the art world, whether regarding cartoon
characters or more sophisticated fare, the First Amendment sensi-
tivities that are looming larger in trademark jurisprudence gener-
ally2" will surely be felt in character licensing as well. As copyright
23. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960 (Oct. 1993).
24. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989); Girl Scouts v. Bantam,
[Vol. 11:421
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and trademark principles converge, 25 as First Amendment princi-
ples impinge on simplified notions of property ownership, and as
concerns over encouragement theory itself 6 begin to make them-
selves felt, the limits of character protection will become less cer-
tain. The panel, in its brief time, could not fully explore all the
relevant issues. However, both the presentations and exchange
thereafter indicated how rich was the topic and how intriguing are
the still unanswered questions.
808 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (S.D. N.Y. 1992); Lighthawk v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 1095 (W.D.
Wash. 1993). See also, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as
Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
665, 673, 720 n.356 (1992); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398 (1990); Robert C.
Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales
for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 158, 202 (1982).
25. See Michael Todd Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The
Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial
Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1992).
26. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges
of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989).
1994]
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